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Introduction
Animals commonly vocalize when threatened by a
predator. These signals, usually termed alarm calls
(from old Italian all arme ‘to arms’ on the approach
of an enemy), have continued to bewilder and fasci-
nate for a number of reasons, the first of which is
mainly practical. In animal research, it is often diffi-
cult to break down the continuous behavioral stream
into discrete and meaningful units, which can be
studied systematically. Alarm calls are a rare and
noticeable exception. They are highly discrete and
easy to identify, making it possible to systematically
study both the causes and consequences of behavior.
A second motivation, related to the previous one and
significant for the evolution of linguistic abilities,
relates to the fact that alarm calls provide a unique
tool for accessing the cognitive mechanisms underly-
ing an animal’s behavior. Finally, alarm calls are in-
teresting because they seem to pose a problem for
evolutionary theory. They are often among the most
prominent and noticeable signals in a species’ reper-
toire, and it seems paradoxical for individuals to
behave conspicuously in the presence of a predator,
thereby revealing their presence and location (e.g.,
Shalter, 1978).
Following these considerations, this article has the
following objectives. First, it summarizes research
that has dealt with the problem of why animals pro-
duce seemingly maladaptive behavior in the presence
of a predator. What are the evolutionary processes
that have provided a selective advantage to individuals
who behave this way? Second, from a cognitive–
linguistic perspective, the article seeks to seize the
unique opportunity that alarm calls offer, that is, to
try to describe the cognitive processes that underlie
call production. Several empirical studies are dis-
cussed that have aimed to investigate the relationship
between the occurrence of an external event (i.e., the
appearance of a predator) and the production and
comprehension of these signals, particularly in the
nonhuman primates. No attempt is made to provide
a systematic overview of alarm calling in the various
taxonomic groups, however. Instead, a handful of
empirical studies have been selected, particularly
those that are likely to inform the linguistically in-
terested reader about core cognitive phenomena
in nonhumans and their potential relevance for the
evolution of linguistic capacities in humans.
The Evolution of Alarm Calls
Three main groups of evolutionary hypotheses have
been put forward to explain why animals produce
conspicuous vocalizations in the presence of a preda-
tor. First, attention-grabbing behavior in the presence
of a predator can provide a selective advantage to the
signaler if it increases the survival chances of closely
related kin (Maynard Smith, 1965). Calling may be
risky, but under this hypothesis, the costs are out-
weighed by the benefits of increased survival of re-
cipients who carry a proportion of the caller’s genes
(the kin selection hypothesis). Second, alarm calling is
beneficial to a signaler if it increases the reproductive
success of the caller (the sexual selection hypothesis).
Third, alarm calling is beneficial if it elicits behavior
in others that decreases the vulnerability of the caller
directly (the individual selection hypothesis). Within
this third hypothesis, two scenarios have been
proposed. The first one considers the effects of alarm
calling on conspecific recipients (the prey manipula-
tion hypothesis). Here, calling is costly at the begin-
ning of a predator–prey interaction, but quickly
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becomes outweighed by the benefits accrued by other
individuals’ antipredator responses. A good example
is the turmoil caused by individuals escaping when
hearing an alarm call, creating a cloud of confusion
for the predator from which the caller can benefit.
However, in some cases animals give alarm calls in
the absence of a conspecific audience, suggesting that
the behavior has evolved for other purposes.
A popular idea here is that some predators are affect-
ed by the alarm calls directly, without the intermedi-
ate step of other prey behavior (the perception
advertisement hypothesis). This is especially the
case for predators who depend on unprepared prey.
Particularly in the bird literature, the term ‘mobbing
call’ is sometimes used, mainly to refer to cases
where alarm calls are part of more elaborate displays,
involving conspicuous locomotory behavior in the
presence of the predator.
It is important to point out that the three hypoth-
eses are not mutually exclusive but may operate
alongside each other in various ways. In the following
sections, selected empirical findings that support
one or several of the selective forces underlying the
evolution of alarm calling are discussed.
Alarm Calls Favored by Kin Selection
One recurrent finding is that alarm callers are sus-
ceptible to the type of audience present (e.g.,
Karakashian et al., 1988). A first solution to the
apparent alarm call paradox is, therefore, that indivi-
duals call preferentially when close genetic relatives
are nearby. Under such circumstances kin selection
theory can explain the evolution of conspicuous sig-
naling in the presence of predators. The reasoning is
that costly alarm calling can still be beneficial if it
improves the survival of individuals that share a cer-
tain proportion of the caller’s own genes. One testable
prediction is that individuals produce alarm calls as a
function of the number of close relatives in the audi-
ence. The empirical evidence for the kin selection
hypothesis is strongest for the parent–offspring rela-
tion (e.g., Blumstein et al., 1997), and alarm calling
in this context may be conceptualized as a form of
altruistic parental care.
A related but empirically more challenging endeav-
or is based on the assumption that callers inevitably
share high degrees of genetic relatedness with some
other nondescendent kin, such as brothers and sisters.
If kin selection operates as a selective force, then
individuals should be just as willing to engage in
risky alarm call behavior if it increases the survival
chances of closely related nondescendent kin, apart
from that of their own offspring, as long as they are
sufficiently closely related to one another. Much em-
pirical effort has been devoted to this topic, particu-
larly in various rodent species, but the overall picture
is incoherent. Males and females often differ in their
alarm calling in the presence of nondescendent
kin, suggesting that kin selection may have affected
individuals in sex-specific ways. For example, in
Gunnison’s prairie dogs, Cynomys gunnisoni, females
with nearby nondescendent kin call more often to a
ground predator than females without nondescendent
kin. Males commonly produce alarm calls, but calling
is unrelated to kinship of nearby listeners (Hoogland,
1996). A nondescendent kin audience may enhance
alarm calling to particular predator types only, but
patterns vary from one species to the next. For exam-
ple, Belding’s ground squirrels, Spermophilus belding,
show kin-sensitive response to terrestrial but not to
aerial predators, where the caller’s own exposure
appears to be the main factor (Sherman, 1977,
1985). Conversely, the opposite pattern was found
in Columbian ground squirrels (Spermophilus colum-
bianus) (Macwhirter, 1992). In this species, females
with offspring were more likely than other females
to give alarm calls in response to a ground predator,
but females did not behave nepotistically toward
other nondescendent kin. However, females were
more likely to emit alarm calls in response to aerial
predators if close nondescendent kin were in the
colony.
Kin selection has also been put forward as an ex-
planation for the evolution of alarm calls in non-
human primates, although the overall evidence is
weak, at least for benefiting nondescendent kin. For
example, spider monkeys alter their alarm call behav-
ior as a function of the number of kin in the vicinity
(Chapman et al., 1990). Similarly, Kloss’s gibbons
produce alarm calls that can be heard in neighboring
home ranges, which are often occupied by the callers’
close relatives, suggesting that these calls may warn
not only members of the immediate family, but also
neighboring relatives (Tenaza and Tilson, 1977).
The emerging picture of the role of kin selection is
that (a) alarm calling is clearly affected by the pres-
ence of descendent kin, and as such is a common
aspect of parental care, and (b) in some species, kin
selection may have additionally favored alarm calling
to benefit a nondescendent kin audience, but no gen-
eral patterns have emerged. In cases in which indivi-
duals’ alarm calls appear to warn nondescendent
relatives, kin selection seems to have acted in various
idiosyncratic ways.
Alarm Calls Favored by Sexual Selection
Animals often give alarm calls when no kin are near-
by, requiring a different set of evolutionary explana-
tions. One set is built on the idea that alarm calls are
sexually selected signals produced by males as part of
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their attempts to increase their reproductive success
(Zuberbu¨hler, 2002). According to Darwin (1871),
sexual selection ‘‘. . . depends, not on the struggle for
existence, but on a struggle between the males for
possession of the females; the result is not death of
the unsuccessful competitor, but few or no offspring.’’
In these cases, however, sexual selection must have
acted as a secondary evolutionary force on communi-
cation systems in which alarm calls have already been
present.
The sexual selection hypothesis is currently sup-
ported by a number of observations relating to alarm
call structure and usage. In some species, males are
more likely toproduce alarmcallswhile in the presence
of unrelated females than to other audiences (e.g.,
Evans et al., 1994), suggesting that alarm calls may
be part of a mating strategy to enhances the caller’s
reproductive success. Similarly, male vervet monkeys
(Cercopithecus aethiops) alarm call at higher rates
in the presence of adult females than adult males
(Cheney and Seyfarth, 1990). In some species, not
only do adult males differ from other age/sex classes
in terms of call usage, but their alarm calls are also
structurally different from those of the adult females.
For example, it has long been known that the adult
males inmany forest monkey species produce conspic-
uous loud calls in response to predators, which carry
over remarkable distances (e.g., Gautier and Gautier,
1977). Recent research on West African Diana
monkeys, Cercopithecus diana, and other forest
primates has shown that these calls function as pre-
dator alarm calls (Zuberbu¨hler, 2002, 2003). Diana
monkeys live in small but stable social groups with
one adult male and several adult females with their
offspring (Uster andZuberbu¨hler, 2001).Themonkeys
arehuntedby leopards (Pantherapardus) andcrowned
eagles (Stephanoaetus coronatus), and both the adult
male and the females produce conspicuous alarm calls
to these two predators. However, the calls of themales
are structurally different from those of the females.
They are low-pitched, high-amplitude signals given in
repeated bursts, which carry over long distances
through dense tropical forest habitat, sometimes up to
one kilometer (Zuberbu¨hler, 2003) (Figure 1).
A number of observations support the hypothesis
that these male alarm calls have been under pressure
by sexual selection. Polygynous social systems, in
which one adult male mates with several adult
females, are notorious for sexually selected conspicu-
ous male traits, including vocalizations (Clutton-
Brock and Albon, 1979). In these social systems,
male competition over females is especially high,
which typically leads to the evolution of male traits
that are useful in male–male competition or that
females find attractive (Anderson, 1994). In polygy-
nous monkeys, such as the Diana monkey, males
typically try to take over a group of females and
mate with them for some time until replaced by an-
other male. If females are able to exert some choice
over tenure length of a particular male, then one
might expect to see a relation between female toler-
ance toward the male and how committed he is to
engaging in antipredator behavior, such as produc-
ing costly alarm calls in the presence of a predator
(Eckardt and Zuberbu¨hler, 2004). An alternative ex-
planation is that sexual selection has usurped male
alarm calls and transformed them into signals effec-
tive in male–male competition. The fact that the male
alarm calls carry over very long distances suggests
that the intended recipients are not just the male’s
own group members (which are usually within
about 100m), but also single males roving through
the forest or subadult males in neighboring groups.
By making their presence and vigor known, tenured
males may avoid costly encounters with these males
in search of a group of females.
It is interesting to note that during puberty several
developmental changes occur in the vocal behavior of
male Diana monkeys and other guenons, specifically
a drop in pitch and the loss of some of the juvenile
vocal repertoire (Gautier and Gautier, 1977). In the
Taı¨ forest, Ivory Coast, subadult male Diana monkeys
go through a phase in which their alarm shows rem-
nants of a female alarm call as well as the first
emerging elements of a fully developed male loud
call, suggesting that males go through a transition
phase when their calls develop from female alarm
calls to male loud calls (Zuberbu¨hler, 2002), a further
sign that sexual selection has acted secondarily on the
structure and usage of male monkey alarm calls.
Strong evidence for the sexual selection hypothesis is
not yet available, although the hypothesis makes vari-
ous testable predictions. For example, for females to be
able to exert a choice, male alarm calls must be indi-
vidually distinctive, perhaps more so than their own
calls. In Diana monkeys, this is certainly the impres-
sion one gets after listening to various recordings.
Another prediction might be that after a new male
takes over, he ought to be especially eager to demon-
strate his commitment to antipredator defense by pro-
ducing large numbers of alarm calls. One such case has
been documented in putty-nosed monkeys (Cerco-
pithecus nictitans; Eckardt and Zuberbu¨hler, 2004).
Alarm Calls Favored by Individual Selection
Both kin selection and sexual selection suggest
that alarm calling provides a net benefit to the caller
because it increases the survival chances of close ge-
netic relatives or the reproductive success of the
caller. However, in some cases callers may also
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enjoy direct benefits from their actions in terms of
their own survival. This is the case if alarm calls elicit
collective antipredator behavior in nearby recipients,
which confuses or disorients the predator (the prey
manipulation hypothesis) (e.g., Charnov and Krebs,
1975).
An alternative idea is that alarm calls directly inter-
fere with the predator’s hunting tactic, for example, if
predators depend on unwary prey (the perception-
advertisement hypothesis), (e.g., Bergstrom and
Lachmann, 2001). Recently, this version of the indi-
vidual selection hypothesis has received some empiri-
cal attention. Work on free-ranging Diana monkeys
has shown that some primate alarm calls function to
advertise perception to predators that rely on unpre-
pared prey, such as leopards (Zuberbu¨hler and Jenny,
2002) and crowned eagles (Shultz and Noe¨, 2002).
Playback experiments have demonstrated that the
presence of crowned eagles and leopards reliably eli-
cited high rates of conspicuous alarm calls in Diana
monkeys, whereas playbacks of two other equally
dangerous predators, chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes)
and human poachers, never did (Zuberbu¨hler, 2003).
The most likely explanation for these striking differ-
ences in alarm call usage is that chimpanzees and
humans, but not leopards or eagles, are able to pursue
monkeys in the trees, which greatly increases the costs
of conspicuous alarm calling. A follow-up study in-
volving most other primate species in the Taı¨ Forest
indicated that the pattern described for the Diana
monkeys is also accurate for other monkey species
(Zuberbu¨hler, 2003; Figure 2).
But are these alarm calls really effective in deterring
monkey-hunting leopards? To investigate whether
or not this is the case, the hunting behavior of a
number of wild leopards in the Taı¨ forest has been
monitored with the help of radio-tracking equipment
(Zuberbu¨hler, 2003; Zuberbu¨hler and Jenny, 2002).
Results have shown that forest leopards hunt
monkeys by approaching unwary groups and hiding
in their vicinity, presumably to wait for individuals to
descend to the ground. Once the monkeys detected a
Figure 1 Spectrographic representations of the predator alarm calls of male and female Dianamonkeys in the Taı¨ Forest, Ivory Coast.
Reprinted from Zuberbuhler K, Cheney D L & Seyfarth R M (1999). Journal of Comparative Psychology 113, p. 33–42. Copyright 1999 by the
American Psychological Association. Reproduced with permission.
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hiding leopard, however, they invariably began to
produce alarm calls at very high rates, which typically
caused the leopard to leave the area (Figure 3),
showing that these alarm calls function to advertise
perception and to deter the stalking leopards.
The Cognitive Bases of Alarm Calls
The previous section addressed the problem of why
animals produce conspicuous alarm calls in the pres-
ence of a predator; the remainder of the article deals
with the cognitive processes involved in alarm call
production and perception. The focus is on empirical
evidence that is perhaps most relevant for the lin-
guistically interested reader: the kinds of cognitive
abilities nonhuman primates recruit when processing
their own vocalizations. Results are relevant to assess
whether or not these abilities are akin to those
involved in speech processing in humans. Theories of
language origins have to explain how the highly com-
plex and sophisticated cognitive capacity required
for language processing has evolved in an extremely
short period of time. Several lines of evidence suggest
that humans did not have the anatomical and neural
prerequisites to produce modern speech until very
recently (Lieberman, 2000; Enard et al., 2002). One
implication is that many of the cognitive capacities
required for language are phylogenetically much
older, having evolved in the primate lineage long be-
fore the advent of modern humans and for reasons
other than language production. An empirical investi-
gation of the cognitive capacities of our closest living
relatives, the nonhuman primates, is therefore of par-
ticular interest, because they may shed light on the
evolutionary origins of cognitive processes underlying
speech. Of particular interest are semantic and syntac-
tic abilities, as they are central to virtually every defi-
nition of language (Crystal, 1997). Three aspects
are dealt with: (a) the structure of alarm calls, (b)
how they are being used in particular circumstances,
and (c) the kinds of mental processes that recipients
activate when responding to them.
Figure 2 Alarm call behavior of six Taı¨ monkeys in response to
chimpanzee pant hoots and leopard growls. Reprinted from
Zuberbuhler K, Jenny D & Bshary R (1999). Ethology 105,
477–490. Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Reproduced with permission.
Figure 3 (A) Immobilized forest leopard is being equipped with
a radio-tracking collar. (B) Average duration of hiding behavior of
Taı¨ leopards before and after detection by a group of monkeys.
Reprinted from Zuberbuhler K, Jenny D & Bshary R (1999). Ethol-
ogy 105, 477–490. Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Reproduced with
permission.
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Alarm Call Structure
The fact that an animal produces different types of
alarm calls alone is not a particularly exciting finding;
it has been demonstrated in many groups of animals,
primates and nonprimates alike (e.g., nonprimates:
Slobodchikoff et al., 1991; Blumstein and Arnold,
1995; Gyger et al., 1987; e.g., primates: Struhsaker,
1967; Macedonia and Evans, 1993; Fichtel and
Kappeler, 2002; Eckardt and Zuberbu¨hler, 2004). In
primates, and probably most other groups, alarm call
production appears to be under relatively tight genet-
ic control, with callers having little flexibility for
structural modification (see Blumstein, 1999). For
example, infant vervet monkeys rarely produce
alarm calls, but if they do, their alarm calls are acous-
tically similar to those of adult animals (Seyfarth and
Cheney, 1997). Their vocal stiffness is the product of
very limited control over the articulators, particularly
the tongue (Riede et al., 2005). Although some flexi-
bility is possible, nonhuman primates simply do
not have sufficient command over the geometry of
their vocal tracts to deliver the extensive array of
phonemes that bring about human speech.
How exactly the different acoustic structures
emerge in the different animal species may not be a
random affair. Marler (1955) has argued that some
animals have evolved alarm calls with acoustic fea-
tures that make it hard for predators to detect the
caller. The classic example is a passerine aerial preda-
tor alarm, the ‘‘seeet’’ call, which humans find hard to
locate. However, experimental work has shown that
several raptors are able to accurately orient toward
the source of playback recordings of passerine ‘‘seeet’’
calls, although the response rates were somewhat
lower compared to other alarm call types (Shalter,
1978). Whether this was a result of the raptors’
experiencing perceptual difficulties, as Marler ar-
gued, or whether the raptors were simply less moti-
vated to orient toward ‘‘seeet’’ calls because they
indicated that the prey was alert, as Shalter argued,
is an unresolved issue.
Another line of reasoning refers to the idea that
there is an inherent relation between an individual’s
psychological state and the acoustic structure of the
vocalizations it produces, the so-called motivational-
structural rules (Morton, 1977). Here, the proposi-
tion is that individuals give low-frequency atonal
vocalizations when prepared to assail an opponent.
High-frequency tonal vocalizations, in turn, are more
likely to be linked with an intention to withdraw. As
predators differ in the kinds of threat they pose, and
the most adaptive strategies to counteract them, this
line of reasoning may also explain some acoustic
patterns in alarm calls (see following discussion).
Alarm Call Usage
From a comparative cognitive perspective, studies of
call usage are of some interest because it is sometimes
possible to determine what aspects of the environ-
ment an individual responds to when giving alarm
calls. Particularly enlightening work has been con-
ducted on domestic chickens (Gallus domesticus).
Cockerels produce acoustically distinct alarms to
raptors and ground predators, suggesting that these
alarm calls might function as labels for certain preda-
tor classes. However, experiments have shown that
callers mainly respond to a predator’s direction of
attack, regardless of its biological class. For example,
when a picture of a raccoon, a typical ground preda-
tor, is moved across an overhead video screen,
cockerels respond with aerial alarm calls, which
they normally give to raptors (Evans et al., 1994).
Similarly, although some species of squirrels produce
acoustically distinct alarm calls, they also appear not
to respond to the predator category per se, but instead
to the relative distance and threat imposed by the
predator (e.g., Leger et al., 1980). The squirrels’
alarm call system is hence capable of encoding the
degree of urgency that a caller assigns to a particular
event. Similar findings have been reported from
other species, such as Arabian babblers (Turdoides
squamiceps; Naguib et al., 1999) and yellow-bellied
marmots (Marmota flaviventris; Blumstein and
Armitage, 1997), both of which produce acoustically
distinct alarm calls but do not assign them systemati-
cally to particular types of predators.
This naturally raises the question of whether or not
it is appropriate to assume that monkey alarm calls
are labels for different types of predators, in the sense
that they encode the biological class of predators.
Similar to chickens or marmots, monkeys may simply
respond to the momentary threat imposed by a pred-
ator, regardless of its biological class. Here, alarm
calls may be reflections of a caller’s momentary per-
ceived threat, rather than true labels of external
events. To distinguish between the two hypotheses,
the following playback experiment was conducted
with Diana monkeys. Recordings of eagle shrieks or
leopard growls were broadcast from a concealed
speaker to various wild groups throughout the Taı¨
forest. The position of the speaker was altered sys-
tematically such that groups differed in how they
encountered the alleged predator. In some cases, the
predator vocalizations, either eagle shrieks or leopard
growls, were either close or far, or played from below
or from above, resulting in eight different playback
conditions. Monkeys consistently responded to the
predator category represented by the playback sti-
muli, regardless of immediate threat or direction of
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attack. Similar findings were later reported from
closely related Campbell’s monkeys, Cercopithecus
campbelli, suggesting that nonhuman primates gener-
ally label the biological class of a predator, regardless
of momentary discrepancies in degrees of threat
(Zuberbu¨hler, 2003).
How does an individual monkey learn to use the
leopard alarm call to leopards, but not to snakes? Not
much is known about how monkeys learn to use their
alarm call repertoire. Some observational data are
available from free-ranging vervet monkeys. Al-
though monkeys come in contact with over 150 spe-
cies of birds and mammals, only a small proportion of
these species pose a threat (Seyfarth and Cheney,
1997). One intriguing observation has been that in-
fant vervet monkeys do not appear to apply their
innately encoded set of alarm calls randomly to
these various groups of animals. Instead, infants
give eagle alarm calls only to birds and objects in
the air, but never to terrestrial animals (Cheney and
Seyfarth, 1990). Similarly, infants initially give leop-
ard alarm calls to a variety of species on the ground,
most of which do not pose any danger to them. One
interpretation has been that primates are predisposed
from birth to divide other animals into a few main
groups and then learn to restrict call usage to a small
number of relevant predator classes (Seyfarth and
Cheney, 1997). Thus, alarm calls appear to be the
output of certain psychological states, which are in-
voked by certain types of events. During maturation
monkeys learn to restrict call use to those few species
that pose a threat to them. This may also explain why
alarm call production is so uniform across various
populations in a given species.
In this sense, alarm call production might be anal-
ogous to nonlinguistic human utterances, such as
laughing. Whether or not an event is perceived as
amusing is the result of a cognitive process that
draws on various memories. Once it qualifies, peo-
ple will inadvertently experience amusement, and
laughing will be difficult to suppress.
The following observation may illustrate the
point. In a group of Campbell’s monkeys, housed
at the Paimpont Primate Research Station of the
University of Rennes, a captive-born adult male
was observed to produce eagle alarm calls during
an aggressive interaction with a group of DeBrazza’s
monkeys (Cercopithecus neglectus), housed in the
adjacent cage (Zuberbu¨hler, unpublished data).
During the interaction, the male was vigorously
shaking the fence, trying to assault the neighbor-
ing individuals, a behavior regularly seen in free-
ranging males interacting with predatory crowned
eagles. Eagle alarm calls, in other words, may be
the vocal manifestation of an extremely aggressive
motivation on behalf of the male, which in the wild
is typically elicited by the appearance of a crowned
eagle. The captive male, having never had the op-
portunity to interact with an eagle, produced the
calls during an aggressive interaction with another
monkey species.
Alarm Call Comprehension: Conspecific Calls
What kinds of mental representations do individuals
activate as recipients of alarm calls, that is, when
hearing another individual’s calls? One answer
comes from a classic study conducted on East African
vervet monkeys. In this species, individuals produce
acoustically different alarm calls to at least five dif-
ferent types of predators: large terrestrial carni-
vores, eagles, snakes, baboons, and unfamiliar
humans (Seyfarth and Cheney, 1997; Struhsaker,
1967). Playback experiments have demonstrated
that some of these calls elicit in other monkeys anti-
predator responses that resemble their natural re-
sponse to the corresponding predators. For example,
playbacks of eagle alarm calls cause monkeys to look
up into the air or run into a bush (Seyfarth et al.,
1980; Struhsaker, 1967). In the meantime, similar
findings have been reported from other monkey spe-
cies. As mentioned previously, Diana monkey males
and females produce acoustically different alarm calls
to crowned eagles and leopards. When hearing a
male’s alarm calls, nearby females respond with
their own corresponding alarm calls, suggesting that
the calls contain information about the type of
predator present (Figure 4).
What kinds of mental representations are responsi-
ble for the monkeys’ behavior? A cognitively simple
model might suggest that the females’ response is
based on rather superficial processing: individuals
respond to the physical features of alarm calls with-
out accessing any of their potential associated mean-
ings. Alternatively, alarm call processing might be
more akin to that of linguistic information proces-
sing. In human language, speech sounds are not just
processed at the peripheral acoustic level, but in rela-
tion to the types of cognitive structures they refer
to, which are shared by both the signaler and the
recipient (e.g., Yates and Tule, 1979).
Under field conditions, questions concerning men-
tal processes are difficult to address, mainly because
the choice of experimental techniques is so limited.
One paradigm has turned out to be of significant
value: the prime-probe technique. It is a variant of
the habituation–dishabituation procedure initially
developed for prelinguistic children (Eimas et al.,
1971), but differs from it because it does not have a
long habituation phase. Instead, animals are provided
with a one-time exposure to some critical information
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and then tested on the effect of this manipulation of
their subsequent response to an experimental probe
stimulus. Figure 5 illustrates the design used to inves-
tigate whether Diana monkeys process alarm calls
by accessing mental representations of associated
predator classes.
In each trial, the playback speaker was positioned
in the vicinity of a monkey group. Monkeys were
primed with either predator vocalizations (baseline)
or alarm calls (test and control). After a five-minute
period of silence, the probe stimulus was broadcast.
Baseline, test, and control conditions differed in
the types of changes between prime and probe stimu-
lus. In the baseline condition, both the acoustic and
semantic features were alike. The prediction was
that subjects would produce many alarm calls to
the prime stimulus but only few calls to the probe
stimulus because both the acoustic and the semantic
information were repeated. In the test condition,
subjects heard alarm calls followed by vocalizations
of the corresponding predator. In this condition, the
semantic features remained the same, whereas
the acoustic features changed. Subjects were expected
to respond to the probe by producing (a) many alarm
calls (if they attended to the acoustic-perceptual fea-
tures) or (b) few alarm calls (if they attended to the
semantic-conceptual information). Finally, in the
control condition, both the acoustic and the semantic
features changed. Subjects heard an alarm call fol-
lowed by the call of the noncorresponding predator.
Because both the acoustic and the semantic features
changed, subjects were expected to produce many
alarm calls to both the prime and the probe stimuli,
regardless of how they processed the calls.
Results showed that the semantic content of the
prime stimuli, not their acoustic features alone,
explained the response patterns of the monkeys to
the probe stimuli (Zuberbu¨hler, 2003). That is, both
eagle shrieks and leopard growls, two very powerful
stimuli, lost their effectiveness in eliciting alarm calls
when subjects were primed with the corresponding
male alarm calls. Figure 6 illustrates the effect in
response to the crowned eagle.
In conclusion, this experiment suggests that only
variation in the semantic properties mattered to the
monkeys when reacting to the vocalizations. Primates,
in other words, appear be able to process alarm calls
on a conceptual–semantic rather than a perceptual–
acoustic level (Cheney and Seyfarth, 1990).
Alarm Call Comprehension: Eavesdropping
Primates are highly attentive to the alarm calls of
other species. Vervet monkeys (Cercopithecus
aethiops), for example, respond to superb starlings’
(Spreo superbus) terrestrial and raptor alarm calls as
a function of the calls’ referential space – the natural
range of predators that typically elicit the alarm calls.
Young vervet monkeys need several months to learn
to fully interpret starling alarm calls (Cheney and
Seyfarth, 1990). Taı¨ forest monkeys respond to the
alarm calls of several nonprimate species that are
hunted by leopards, such as various species of
squirrels and duikers. One interpretation is that the
monkeys have a fairly sophisticated understanding
of the causes that determine another species’ alarm
call behavior. Interspecies communication, in other
words, may provide additional valuable opportu-
nities to investigate the cognitive mechanisms under-
lying monkey alarm call processing.
To investigate whether monkeys are able to attend
to the most likely cause of an alarm call, as opposed
to responding directly to the alarm call itself,
the following experiment was conducted. Crested
guinea fowls (Guttera pucherani), a gregarious
ground-dwelling forest bird, produce alarm calls to
a series of ground predators, including humans and
leopards.When hearing guinea fowl alarm calls, Diana
monkeys typically respond with leopard alarm calls,
Figure 4 Diana monkey responses to playbacks of predator
vocalizations presented with varying degrees of threat: (A) dis-
tance, (B) direction of attack. Reproduced from Zuberbuhler K
(2000).Animal Behaviour 59(5), 917–927,with permission of Elsevier.
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suggesting that the monkeys associate guinea fowl
alarm calls with the presence of a leopard. However,
crested guinea fowls sometimes give the same alarm
calls to humans, which appears to place the monkey in
a behavioral dilemma: the best antipredator response
to humans is to remain silent to avoid detection,
whereas the best response to leopards is produce a
large number of alarm calls to advertise perception.
Figure 5 Design of the playback study: Monkey groups are primed with eagle- or leopard-related stimuli and then tested with eagle
shrieks. Baseline, test, and control condition differ in the acoustic and semantic similarity of the prime and probe stimuli. X-axes of
spectrograms represent time(s), y-axes represent frequencies (kHz). Reprinted from Zuberbuhler K, Cheney D L & Seyfarth R M (1999).
Journal of Comparative Psychology 113, 33–42. Copyright 1999 by the American Psychological Association. Reproduced with permission.
Figure 6 Results of the prime-probe experiments using eagle shrieks as probe stimuli. Histograms represent the median number of
eagle alarm calls (hatched) or leopard alarm calls (solid) given in the first minute after a playback stimulus. Error bars indicate the
values of the third quartile of the data set. The points connected by lines between them represent the median alarm call rate during the
five-minute period of silence in between two playback stimuli. Using leopard growls as a probe stimulus yielded analogous results.
Reprinted from Zuberbuhler K, Cheney D L & Seyfarth R M (1999). Journal of Comparative Psychology 113, 33–42. Copyright 1999 by the
American Psychological Association. Reproduced with permission.
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To make the appropriate decision, Diana monkeys
have to be able to draw some inferences about the
possible causes of the birds’ alarm calls. To investi-
gate the monkeys’ level of causal understanding, dif-
ferent groups of Diana monkeys were primed to the
presence of a leopard or a human poacher by playing
back brief recordings of either leopard growls or
human speech in the vicinity of a monkey group.
Then, after a five-minute period of silence, the same
group was exposed to playbacks of guinea fowl alarm
calls. If the monkeys are able to draw inferences
about the potential causes of guinea fowl alarm
calls, then they should response with alarm calls
after being primed with leopard growls, but not
after being primed with human speech. However, if
the monkeys have simply learned to associate guinea
fowl alarm calls with the presence of a leopard (as
their natural response seems to suggest), then their
response to guinea fowl alarm calls should not differ
between the two conditions. Results revealed sig-
nificant differences in the way leopard-primed and
human-primed Diana monkey groups responded to
guinea fowl alarm calls, suggesting that the monkeys’
response was not driven by the guinea fowl alarm
calls themselves, but by their momentary beliefs of
the type of predator most likely to have caused the
birds to give alarm calls (Zuberbu¨hler, 2003).
A similar problem exists when the monkeys are
confronted with a nearby group of chimpanzees, a
dangerous predator (Boesch and Boesch-Achermann,
2000). But chimpanzees are occasionally attacked
and preyed upon by leopards themselves (Boesch
and Boesch-Achermann, 2000; Zuberbu¨hler and
Jenny, 2002). When this happens they give loud and
conspicuous alarm calls, the ‘SOS’ screams (Goodall,
1986). When chimpanzee SOS screams were broad-
cast to different groups of Diana monkeys, about half
of all the groups tested switched from a chimp-
specific cryptic response to a leopard-specific con-
spicuous response (see Figure 2), suggesting that in
some groups individuals assumed the presence of a
leopard when hearing the chimpanzee alarm screams.
Interestingly, Diana monkey groups with a home
range in the core area of a resident chimpanzee com-
munity were significantly more likely to do so than
peripheral groups, which were more likely to re-
spond cryptically, suggesting that Diana monkey
groups differ in semantic knowledge of chimpanzee
vocal behavior (Zuberbu¨hler, 2003; Figure 7).
Interspecies communication not only occurs be-
tween predator and prey but also between different
species of primates. For example, ring-tailed lemurs
(Lemur catta) respond appropriately not only to their
own alarm calls but also to playbacks of the alarm
calls of sympatric sifakas (Propithecus verreauxi; Oda
and Masataka, 1996). The Taı¨ monkeys regularly
forage in mixed species groups to improve their pro-
tection against predation, and it is therefore not
surprising that individuals of mixed species groups
respond to each other’s alarm calls, such as in the
case of the Diana monkey–Campbell’s monkey associ-
ation (Wolters and Zuberbu¨hler, 2003). Male Camp-
bell’s monkeys produce two acoustically different
alarm calls to crowned eagles and leopards. Playbacks
of Diana monkey alarm calls to Campbell’s monkeys
and vice versa reliably elicited the appropriate alarm
responses in the other species (Zuberbu¨hler, 2003).
This ability, however, may not be a uniquely primate
capacity. Recent playback experiments with yellow-
casqued and black-casqued hornbills showed that
these birds readily distinguish between Diana monkey
eagle and leopard alarm calls (Rainey et al., 2004).
However, primates may be unique in their abil-
ities to attend to the semantic properties of other
species’ alarm calls. For example, in a prime-probe
experiment similar to the one presented earlier
(Figure 5), Diana monkeys have been shown to pro-
cess the semantic features of the Campbell’s alarm
calls analogous to how they process their own calls
(Zuberbu¨hler, 2003). Further work on the Campbell’s–
Diana monkey system showed that alarm calls
undergo semantic adjustments in the minds of the
recipients, depending on the sequencing of alarm
Figure 7 Relationship between a Diana monkey group’s ten-
dency to respond with leopard alarm calls to chimpanzees’ SOS
screams and the location of their home range within the resident
chimpanzees’ territory. Chimpanzee social screams did not elicit
any alarm calls. Reproduced from Zuberbuhler K (2000). Animal
Behaviour 59(5), 917–927, with permission from Elsevier.
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calls. As mentioned earlier, Campbell’s monkey males
give acoustically distinct alarm calls to leopards and
crowned eagles, and Diana monkeys respond to these
calls with their own corresponding alarm calls. How-
ever, in less-dangerous situations, Campbell’s males
often emit a pair of low, resounding ‘boom’ calls
before their alarm calls. Playbacks of boom-intro-
duced Campbell’s eagle or leopard alarm calls no
longer elicited alarm calls in Diana monkeys, indicat-
ing that the booms have affected the semantic
specificity of the subsequent alarm calls, suggesting
that monkeys are able to attend to simple syntactic
cues when responding to each other’s alarm calls
(Zuberbu¨hler, 2003).
Is it reasonable, therefore, to liken these animal sig-
nals to human words? After all, they share one of the
most fundamental properties, the ability to transmit
accurate acoustic information about an external
event, which is subsequently decoded by insightful
recipients. Still, most researchers have remained cau-
tious when interpreting these kinds of data, even in the
case of primates. The reason for that stems from a
fundamental discrepancy between the cognitive pro-
cesses driving alarm call production and those govern-
ing their perception. There is simply no evidence that,
when producing an alarm call, nonhumans are actively
trying to inform each other about the events they have
just witnessed. Instead, primate behavior appears to be
the result of a caller’s egocentric interaction with the
world, although in some cases the signals happen to
reliably and uniquely denote an external event. For this
reason, it has been argued that animal alarm calls are
merely functionally referential (or semantic), in con-
trast to true or intentional referentiality, which presum-
ably underlies human speech. Nevertheless, it would be
interesting to know how ubiquitously human speech
production is intentionally guided, as opposed to speak-
ers’ simply knowing which bits of language are used
appropriately in which circumstances.
Conclusions
Alarm calling is found in a large number of species,
demonstrating its adaptive value in predation avoid-
ance. It is also intriguingly absent in others, such as
some nocturnal prosimians (E. Bramley, personal
communication), suggesting that alarm calls are a
product of sociality. There is evidence that alarm
calls are or have been under the influence of all
major selective forces (i.e., individual, kin, and sexual
selection), although it is difficult to identify general
patterns concerning the importance of these forces.
In nonhuman primates, alarm calling is the result of
complex cognitive processes, particularly in the mind
of the recipient. Nonhuman primates are highly
attentive to stimuli that predict the presence of a
predator, and they have demonstrated astonishing
skills in solving predation-related problems. This is
interesting because predation is an ecological force
usually thought to have led rather basic and rigid
behavioral patterns, but not to higher cognitive
abilities (Humphrey, 1976). For nonhuman primates,
this might have been a misconception because in
many of the experiments discussed here, monkeys
were showing behavior that resulted from seemingly
higher cognitive processes, such as inference making,
causal understanding, semantic and syntactic proces-
sing, and rapid association learning. Predation, in
other words, might have provided a strong selection
pressure to favor the evolution of higher intellectual
faculties in nonhuman primates. The way they pro-
duce, use, and interpret their own and other species’
alarm calls is a clear manifestation of this intelligence.
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